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Abstract
We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of con-
tracting problems involving incentive constraints. These con-
straints make the corresponding maximization (sup) problems non
recursive. Our approach consists of studying a recursive La-
grangian. Under standard general conditions, there is a recursive
saddle point (infsup) functional equation (analogous to Bellman's
equation) that characterizes the solution. Our approach applies
to a large class of contractual problems, as examples, we study
the optimal policies in a model intertemporal participation (de-
fault) constraints and a model with competitive constraints (as in
Ramsey problems).
⁄We would like to thank Fernando Alvarez, Jean-Michel Grandmont, Edward
Green, Esther Hauk, Robert Lucas, Andreu Mas-Colell, Edward Prescott, Victor
Rios,Thomas Sargent, Robert Townsend for comments on earlier developments of
this work.1 Introduction
The use of recursive analysis is one of the main resources available today
to economists studying dynamic models. In the standard case, it is well
known how to determine if a model has a recursive structure; for exam-
ple, Stokey, et al. (1989) describe a large number of models that can be
analyzed recursively. The presence of a recursive formulation implies that
the optimal decision at time t is a time-independent function f of a small
set of state variables. This property plays a crucial role in many appli-
cations of dynamic models for several reasons: it facilitates the analysis
and empirical testing of the model; it is enough to approximate just one
function in order to compute the equilibria for all periods1; contracts can
be speci¯ed without taking into account all past and present realizations
of exogenous stochastic shocks (as they would with Arrow-Debreu con-
tracts) since a few state variables are su±cient statistic for past history;
¯nally, models of learning can be formulated by specifying f as the object
to be learned.
A key condition in standard dynamic programming techniques is
that only past variables can in°uence the set of feasible current actions.
Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that many dynamic economic mod-
els of interest, failed to satisfy this condition and, therefore, the Bellman
equation failed to hold in these models. This is a well known problem
in dynamic games where it is usually imposed that an equilibrium solu-
tion must be sub-game perfect. This lack of recursivity is likely to arise
in contracting problems, where intertemporal participation, incentive or
competitive constraints de¯ne the set of feasible contracts. Also, in mod-
els of optimal policy, agent's reactions to government policies are taken
as constraints. In all those cases, future actions limit the set of current
feasible actions available to the planner. Despite the increased interest in
the study of optimal dynamic contracting problems, a general method for
¯nding a proper recursive formulation is still absent from the literature.
1Several computational algorithms that exploit the recursive structure of the so-
lution are decribed, for example, in the volumes of Cooley (1995) and Marimon and
Scott (1998).
1In this paper we provide an integrated approach for a recursive for-
mulation of a large class of economic models. We show how, in many cases
where implementability constraints depend on plans for future variables
and the original maximization problem is not recursive, an equivalent
recursive saddle point problem can be constructed leading to a recursive
formulation.
We build on traditional tools of economic analysis, such as duality
theory (in optimization problems), ¯xed point theory (in in¯nite dimen-
sional spaces), and dynamic programming.W ep r o c e e di nt h r e es t e p s .W e
¯rst study the planners problem with incentive constraints (PP) as an
in¯nite-dimensional maximization problem, for which standard duality
theory applies. Second, we show the equivalence between the planner's
problem and a modi¯ed saddle point problem (SPP). Third, we extend
dynamic programming theory to show that the (SPP) has a recursive for-
mulation in the sense that it satis¯es a saddle point functional equation
(SPFE) which generalizes Bellman's equation..
The resulting saddle point problem (SPP) expands the set of state
variables to include new variables that summarize the evolution of the
lagrange multipliers of the original (PP) problem2. Such transformation
creates some technical di±culties since the new (co)state variables can
not be bounded. Fortunately, we can exploit the resulting homogeneity
properties of the return function and, in this way, we are able to extend
the standard contraction mapping approach to establish the relationship
between SPP and the SPFE.
We show that solving the lagrangean (SPP) is equivalent to solving
the recursive SPFE without concavity assumptions. This is important
because incentive constraints may not have a convex structure. If con-
2With this formulation, the resulting stationary policy function is continuous.
Without the additional (co)state variables, the value function would be discontin-
uous (to account for the fact that non incentive compatible paths are unfeasible).
Rustichini (1996) has recently followed the approach of allowing discontinuities of the
value function. He does not add co-state variables. Unfortunately, this approach is
very limited since, as our work shows, new co-state variables that account for when
and how incentive constraints have been binding need to be introduced in order to
achieve the optimum under full commitment.
2cavity is satis¯ed, then solving the SPP (and, therfore, the SPFE) is
equivalent with solving the maximization problem PP. In the absence of
concavity, as in any application of lagrangean theory, our SPFE charac-
terization is su±cient but it may not be necessary for a solution.3
Our approach can be applied to a very large class of dynamic macro-
economic models, such as models of optimal ¯scal or monetary policy,
business cycle or ¯nancial markets models with default. It can also be
used in industrial organization models of optimal regulation, game the-
oretical models as well as the study of enforceability and monitoring of
contracts subject to incentive constraints. We do maintain, in this paper,
the assumption of full information4.
That a large class of problems have a common recursive structure
is not just a technical result. It also helps in providing a common eco-
nomic characterization of many contractual problems, perhaps, similar
to the way that the study of recursive competitive equilibria has en-
hanced our understanding of the economic structure that is common to
many dynamic economic models. For example, a standard application
of the Second Welfare Theorem shows that, under some assumptions,
recursive competitive equilibria are solutions to a planner's problem in
which agents' weights are constant across time. Our recursive charac-
terization makes it clear that, with intertemporal incentive constraints,
the recursive solutions correspond to planner's problems where agents'
weights vary according to their histories (more precisely, according to
how incentive constraints have been binding in the past). In our ap-
proach, the additional (co)state variables indicate whether and how such
adaptation of the planner's objective function must take place. In gen-
eral, such adaptation of the planner's objective not only can a®ect the
3Most of the literature on Ramsey taxation proceeds to analyze solutions to the
lagrangean even in the absence of concavity. The lagrangean approach does work
in practice in most cases, since it happens that the lagragean often has a solution.
To the extent that our recursive formulation characterizes all solutions to the SPP,
concavity is no more necessary for our approach than it is for standard applications
of Ramsey equilibria.
4In a follow up paper we characterize recursive contracts with incentive constraints
under private information.
3relative weight across agents, but also the planner's intertemporal valu-
ations. For example, time-inconsistency problems can be interpreted as
the planner's temptation to set the (co)state variables to its initial zero
value.
The fact that at the initial period our (co)state variables are well
de¯ned (in fact, they are zero, re°ecting the fact that there is no past
history) allows for a proper recursive formulation. This, for example, is
not true of the approach of taking \present values as state variables,"
pioneered by the work on repeated games of Abreu, et al. (1990), since
initial present values of an optimal problem can only be obtained once
the problem has been solved. In practice, it is often di±cult to bound the
range of possible initial values, as a backwards iteration of \future present
values" of the APS approach requires. Furthermore, in order to ¯nd the
optimal allocation under the implementability constraints we do not need
to characterize the whole set of feasible contracts (of all sub-game perfect
equilibria in repeated games), and we can exploit e±ciency properties in
order to obtain our recursive characterizations. The fact that we have a
properly de¯ned initial condition and that we can calculate the optimum
"directly" highly simpli¯es the practicl application of our approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
summarize our approach and we show how it can be applied to two
simple examples5. Section 3 develops the saddle-point theory, Sections
4 its dynamic programming formulation, and Section 5 concludes. Most
proofs are contained in the ¯nal appendices.
2 Formulating contracts as recursive Sad-
dle Point Problems
In this section we summarize our approach. We discuss the relationship
between the maximization problem of interest with a saddle point version
5Section 2 is practically self-contained. This should allow the potential user to
apply our approach without having to go through the technicalities in the rest of the
paper.
4of the Bellman equation and conclude that, if the set of state variables is
expanded to include some new co-state variables, the problem becomes
recursive. We also discuss the relationship between these state variables
and the evolution of the distribution of wealth, as well as the relationship
to the time-consistency problem. We apply the results to two examples.
All the proofs, formalities, and the technical assumptions needed are
discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
The standard case of dynamic programming is concerned with prob-










s.t. xt+1 = `(xt;a t;s t+1);a t 2 A(xt;s t);t ¸ 0 (1a)
x0;s 0 given
at measurable with respect to (:::;s t¡1;s t);
where r is a given return function; ¯ 2 (0; 1) the discount factor; fstg an
exogenous Markov stochastic process; x an endogenous state variable; a
a control or decision variable, subject to the technological constraint A,
and, ¯nally, the transition function ` de¯nes the evolution of the endoge-
nous state. The objects ¯;r;A;` and the transition of st are assumed to
be known.
Under standard assumptions, this problem is known to have a recur-
sive structure, in the sense that there exists a value function v satisfying
the Bellman functional equation






0 = `(x; a; s
0)
This functional equation can be derived using standard dynamic pro-
gramming techniques (see, for example, Stokey, et al. (1989)). It yields
a stationary policy function f such that the optimal allocation satis¯es
5at = f(xt;s t) for all t. The key aspects of this observation are that the
policy function f is the same in all periods, and that only the values of
(xt;s t) matter from the whole past history. Given this recursive structure
solving the model amounts to solving for the function f.A n u m b e r o f
computational techniques are available for this purpose.
Nevertheless, many interesting economic problems are not of the
form of Program 0. This often happens in maximization problems that
include di®erent incentive or intertemporal constraints that can not be
reduced to the above technological constraint (1a). In this paper we will









s.t. xt+1 = `(xt;a t;s t+1);a t 2 A(xt;s t); (1a)
g
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2(xt+n;a t+n;s t+n) ¸ 0;j=1 ;:::;k; t ¸ 0(2)
x0;s 0 given.
at measurable with respect to (:::;s t¡1;s t):
Clearly, we have just added the constraint (2) for given g mappings.
Constraints of the form (2) are not a special case of (1a), since they
involve expected values of future variables6. We know from Kydland
and Prescott (1977) that, under these constraints, the usual Bellman
equation is not satis¯ed, the solution is not of the form at = f(xt;s t)
for all t and the whole history of past shocks st can matter for today's
optimal decision.
In this paper we show that problems in the canonical form of Pro-
gram 1 can also be cast in an alternative recursive framework. We con-
sider the two canonical cases Nj = 1 and Nj = 1; other cases can be
6When g2 = r and N = 1 this problem can not be alleviated by substituting the
discounted sum of (2) with the value function v(xt;s t): Even then, this constraint is
not a special case of (1a) because the requirement that ‘ and A be known mappings
in Program 0 would be violated.
6easily incorporated. The ¯rst step in our approach is to convert Program










th(xt;a t;¹ t;° t;s t)
s.t. xt+1 = `(xt;a t;s t+1);a t 2 A(xt;s t); (1a)
¹t+1 = '(¹t;° t;s t+1);° t ¸ 0;t ¸ 0( 3 )
¹0 =0 ;x 0;s 0; given,
(at;° t) measurable with respect to (:::;s t¡1;s t);
where the mappings de¯ning the technological constraints (1a) are as
before, and the mappings h, ' can be derived from r, g;Nj: Here, ¹t acts
as a co-state variable, and we will show that its transition function '
depends on whether the j constraint (2) has Nj =1o r1. Notice that
SPP shares with Program 0 the features of not having future variables in
the constraints and that all the functions in the constraints are known.
This is why, anticipating results, we call this a recursive saddle point
problem. The problem where ¹0 is arbitrary is of theoretical interest, and
it will be considered in Section 3 when we derive a recursive formulation.
We will treat Program 2 as a primitive program and we will show
that there is a duality theorem linking it with Program 1. Unfortunately,
since Program 2 is a saddle point problem, the standard theory of dy-
namic programming does not apply. A main contribution of this paper is
to extend dynamic programming theory to recursive saddle point prob-
lems. We show that, under certain assumptions, solutions to Program 2
obey a saddle point functional equation (SPFE) in the sense that there
exists a unique value function W(x; ¹;s) satisfying









0 = `(x; a; s)
and ¹
0 = '(¹; °; s
0)
7for all (x; ¹; s)a n ds u c ht h a tW(x0;¹ 0;s 0)i st h ev a l u eo fProgram 2
for initial conditions (x0;¹ 0;s 0). This is a generalization of Bellman's
equation. Letting Ã be the policy correspondence of this SPFE,i nt h e
sense that









0 = `(x; a; s)
and ¹
0 = '(¹; °; s
0)
The key result in this paper is that the optimal solution of Program 1
satis¯es (at;° t)=Ã(xt;¹ t;s t)f o ra l lt and ¹0 =0 : and it implies that
the solution is recursive in the sense that only the values of (xt;¹ t;s t)
are relevant from past history and the policy function Ã is time invariant
and can be found by studying the SPFE.
Notice that, in order to have the solution of the SPP equivalent
with the solution of the problem of interest Program 1 calls for setting
¹0 =0 ; w h i l ei nf u t u r ep e r i o d s¹t is determined according to Ã and
'. This is a special feature of the optimal plan that provides a clear
interpretation of the time-inconsistency problem. It is technologically
feasible to the planner to reset ¹t = 0 at any time t; a n dt h i si sw h a ti t
would do if it could ignore past commitments. But if the planner sets
¹t = 0 it will achieve a suboptimal allocation. Full commitment on the
part of the planner means, precisely, that it commits to the evolution
of ¹ determined by Ã and ' for all periods. Dependence of the optimal
solution on ¹ is the reason that the model is not recursive in the standard
sense of having a time-invariant policy function of (x;s):
2.1 Present value constraints.
We now discuss how Program 1 can be transformed into a Program 2
formulation for the case of N = 1. This means that future variables
enter in the implementability constraint (2) in the form of a discounted
present value.
8A case of particular interest is an economy with J agents, each agent
having instantaneous utility function uj,a n dintertemporal participation





n uj(cj;t+n) ¸ Áj(!t)f o r a l l j;t (4)
These constraints restrict the utility of all agents to be at least as large
as some default value Áj(!t). The planner's problem that allocates re-
sources e±ciently subject to individual participation constraints is of
the form of Program 1 with r representing the one-period social wel-
fare function
P
J ®juj;( ®j ¸ 0;
P
J ®j = 1), with g2;j ´ uj(cj;t)a n d
g1;j ´ uj(cj;t)¡Áj(!t). The solution to this problem de¯nes a social con-
tract that takes into account, not only technological, but also incentive
and legal constraints7.
Now we obtain the corresponding SPP of the form of Program 2
















subject to (1a), measurability constraints, and given °t ¸ 0; where, ¯¡t°t
is the Lagrange multiplier of (2) at t.
This is still not of the form of Program 2 above, since future vari-
ables are present in the return function of L. However, under the mea-
surability restriction, the law of iterated expectations implies that the
conditional expectations Et in the objective function of L can be imbed-
d e di nE 0. Finally, reordering terms using simple algebra, it is easy to





t [r(xt;a t st)+°tg1(xt;a t;s t)+¹tg2(xt;a t;s t)]
7Restrictions on budget constraints can also be written as a special case of con-
straints (2) for N = 1: See, for example, Marcet, et al. (1996).
9¹0 =0 ; and, for all t ¸ 0;¹ t+1 = ¹t + °t
is such that, for all feasible sequences, L ´ H:.
Clearly, the saddle point of H is a special case of Program 2, taking
h(x; a;¹; °; s)
´ h0(x; a; s)+°h1(x; a; s)+¹h2(x; a; s)
´ r(x; a; s)+°g1(x; a; s)+¹g2(x; a; s)
'(¹; °; s) ´ ¹ + °; ¹0 =0
Example 1. A partnership with limited commitment
We consider, as an example, a model of a partnership, where sev-
eral agents can share their individual risks and jointly invest in a project
which can not be undertaken by single (or subgroups of) agents. For-
mally, there is a single good and J in¯nitely-lived consumers, with prefer-
ences represented by E0
P1
t=0 ¯t u(cj;t); u strictly concave and monotone;
c represents individual consumption. Agent j receives an endowment of
consumption good !j;t at time t. Total production is given by F(k;µ),
and it can be split into consumption c and investment i: The stock of cap-
ital k depreciates at the rate ±: The joint process fµt;! tg1
t=0 is assumed
to be Markovian and the initial conditions (k0;µ 0;! 0)a r eg i v e n 8.
Under the above constraints, the Second Welfare Theorem implies
that Pareto Optimal (PO) allocations can be decentralized by a system
of competitive markets for every given initial distribution of wealth. PO










8A version of this problem was studied in Marcet and Marimon (1992). They had
two agents, one risk averse and the other an {unconstrained{ risk-neutral agent who
acted as planner. The default value in that paper also depended on capital.
10for positive weights ®; subject to technological constraints and initial
conditions. This problem is of the form of Program 0 with r(x; a; s)= P












Therefore, standard dynamic programming is applicable, the usual Bell-
man equation is satis¯ed, and the optimal solution satis¯es (ct;i t)=
f(kt;! t;µ t), where f is the decision function associated with the standard







; for all i;j and t (5)
In particular, when, by the First Welfare Theorem, the PO allocation is
an Arrow-Debreu competitive allocation, 1=®j is agent j's marginal utility
of income, which {in a strict form of the Permanent Income Hypothesis{
remains constant through time, showing that individual consumption
paths only depend on aggregate consumption and the initial wealth dis-
tribution.
The PO allocation can only be observed in economies where the
planner has the ability to enforce the optimal contract by punishing any
deviation from the optimal plan.9 We now assume the enforcement tech-
nology available to the planner can not prevent any agent from switching
to autarky in a given period and staying there forever. Then, the planner





n u(cj;t+n) ¸ v
a





Under these constraints, the planner's problem is of the form of
Program 1 s i n c e( 6 )i so ft h ef o r m( 2 )f o rN = 1 once we let g
j
2(x; a; s) ´
9If the economy is decentralized by a system of competitive asset markets, full
enforcement implies that all agents honor their debts.
11u(cj)a n dg
j
1(x; a; s) ´ u(cj) ¡ va
j(!).10 Therefore, using the algebra in














































0 =( 1¡ ±)k + i;
X
j2J





0 = ¹ + °
Letting Ã be the policy function associated with this functional
equation, e±cient allocations satisfy (ct;i t;° t)=Ã(kt;¹ t;µ t;! t) with
initial conditions (k0; 0;µ 0;! 0).
Notice that the objective function of (7) can be interpreted as if
the weights that the planner assigns to each agent are shifting over time,
according to whether or not the participation constraint is binding. Fur-






; for all i;j and t:
Thus, the optimal allocations amount to choosing e±ciently the time
pro¯le of the time-dependent weights (®j + ¹j;t+1), in such a way that
the participation constraints are satis¯ed. Every time that the partici-
pation constraint for an agent is binding, his weight is increased by the
10Clearly, the function va can be found without knowledge of the solution.
12amount of the corresponding lagrange multiplier. An agent is induced
not to default by increasing his consumption not only in the period where
he is tempted to default, but also for many of the following periods; in
this way, the additional consumption that the agent receives to prevent
default is smoothed over time. That is, individual paths of consumption
depend on individual histories (in particular, on past \temptations to
default") not just on the initial wealth distribution and the aggregate
consumption path, as in the Arrow-Debreu competitive allocations. This
also shows that if enforcement constraints are never binding (e.g., pun-
ishments are severe enough) then ¹t = ¹0 and we recover the \constancy
of the marginal utility of expenditure". In other words, the evolution
of the co-state variables can be also interpreted as the evolution of the
distribution of wealth11.
In Section 3 we state an interiority condition that is needed for exis-
tence of a SPP; also, some convexity conditions are needed for uniqueness
of the solution. These conditions are trivially satis¯ed in this example
under standard strict concavity assumptions.
2.2 Two-period intertemporal constraints
Consider now the case where N = 1 in (2). Intertemporal constraints of
this form arise in dynamic Stackelberg games. For example, in dynamic
Ramsey problems, where the government chooses policy variables subject
to the Euler equations satis¯ed in equilibrium. Example 2 below is one
of these cases.
Let ¯¡t°t be the Lagrange multiplier of (2). We proceed as in
Subsection 2.1, constructing the Lagrangean, applying the law of iterated
expectations and reordering terms in order to group together terms that
depend on information available at t.W ec a nc h e c kw i t hs i m p l ea l g e b r a
that the objective function for the Lagrangian of this problem takes the
11Kletzer and Wright (1998) apply an example, similar to the one presented here,






t (r(xt;a t;s t)+°tg1(xt;a t;s t)+¹tg2(xt;a t;s t)) (8)
for all feasible sequences, letting ¹t = °t¡1 and ¹0 =0 .
The saddle point of H is of the form of Problem 2, taking
h(x; a;¹; °; s)
´ h0(x; a; s)+°h1(x; a; s)+¹h2(x; a; s)
´ r(x; a; s)+°g1(x; a; s)+¹g2(x; a; s)
'(¹; °; s) ´ °; ¹0 =0
Example 2. A Ramsey problem
We consider a simple model of Ramsey equilibrium, which has a
constraint of the form (2) for N = 1. There is a constant returns to
scale technology that, when labor is normalized to one, reduces to the
technology of Example 1. There is a representative agent who rents
capital to a ¯rm and inelastically supplies one unit of labor. Capital
and labor markets are competitive, but no ¯nancial assets are available
to the government. Government spending fc
g
tg generates utility for the
consumer, and it is ¯nanced by levying an income tax, ¿t, that equally
taxes capital and labor income. Furthermore, government's budget must
be balanced in each period. The problem of optimal policy consists
of choosing among di®erent combinations of government spending and
taxes that satisfy the budget constraint of the government and that are
compatible with competitive equilibrium.
This example adds one complication relative to previous papers
on optimal taxation since, even using the primal approach, the imple-
mentability constraints can not be summarized in one constraint as is
14done, for example, in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari, et al. (1995).
This is due to the absence of ¯nancial assets. Other than this, our ex-
ample is meant to be as simple as possible.











ct + kt+1 · rtkt(1 ¡ ¿t)+( 1¡ ±)kt + wt(1 ¡ ¿t)
The Euler, ¯rst order, condition for the consumer is
u
0(ct)=¯Et [u
0(ct+1)( rt+1(1 ¡ ¿t+1)+1¡ ±)] (9)
Since prices are competitive, rt = F0(kt;µ t)a n dwt = F(kt;µ t)¡rtkt.
The budget constraint of the government in period t is,
c
g
t = ¿t(rt kt + wt)=¿t F(kt;µ t)( 1 0 )
Following Ramsey's principle of optimal taxation, the government
maximizes the representative consumer's tastes subject to feasibility con-
straints and the implementability constraints (9) and (10).
Strictly speaking, the 'equal' sign in the above Euler equation means
that the set of allocations that is feasible to the planner has an empty
interior. In the next section it is shown that, as usual, the Lagragean
approach is su±cient for a solution only if an interior point exists. In
appendix 3 we show that, in the usual case, the solution is equivalent to a
problem where the Euler equation is written as a weak inequality. Com-
bining all these observations, we see that the Ramsey problem maximizes



















15Then, the Ramsey problem is of the form of Program 1 with s ´ µ;
x = k; a =( i;c;cg);r (x; a; s)=u(c)+v(cg), `(x; a; s) ´ (1 ¡ ±)k + i,
A(x;s)=f(i;c;cg) ¸ 0:i + c + cg · F(k;µ)g and the constraints (2)
given by
g1(x; a; s) ´¡ u
0(c)













Then, the SPP of Program 2 holds for
















The corresponding SPFE is













With the policy function Ã associated to this SPFE, we can ¯nd the opti-
mal solution to the Ramsey problem by setting (ct;i t;c
g
t;° t)=Ã(kt;µ t;¹ t)
for all t, with ¹0 = 0. This uniquely de¯nes a stationary policy for ¿ in
an obvious way.
As in the previous example, su±cient conditions for the interiority
and convexity conditions are discussed in appendix 3. The interiority
condition is satis¯ed in most applications. The convexity conditions can
only be obtained under restrictive assumptions; obviously, this is not a
problem with our approach, but a problem that often arises in Ramsey
equilibria.
2.3 Other applications and relation to the literature
A number of numerical algorithms can be used to compute (or approx-
imate) the function Ã. A number of applications are already present in
16the literature, and they have used di®erent algorithms. For example,
Marcet and Marimon (1992), Marcet, et al. (1996) and Rojas (1993) ap-
proximate the ¯rst order conditions with PEA, Kehoe and Perry (1998)
perform backward iterations on the value function, which is related to it-
erating the above SPFE,a n dH a n s e n ,et al. (1985) compute the solution
in the linear case using traditional tools of linear dynamic programming.
In a follow up paper we provide several examples and the details in com-
puting solutions to those examples.
Other approaches are available in the literature trying to reduce
the dimension of history-dependent optimal contracts (or equilibrium
strategies). We brie°y mention and discuss those approaches. A detailed
account of advantages and disadvantages of di®erent methods can only
be done in the context of concrete examples and it falls beyond the scope
of this paper.
The work of Hansen, et al. (1985) can be seen as an early ap-
plication of the approach we take in this paper. They formulated the
problem with lagrange multipliers as co-state variables in a linear model
with a two-period constraint like the one discussed in section 2.2. They
also discussed the relation of the ¯xed initial condition ¹0 = 0 with the
time-inconsistency problem. In another piece of early work, Kydland and
Prescott (1980) propose to include the lagrange multiplier of the budget
constraint of the consumer as a co-state variable12.
The primal approach, as applied in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and
Chari, et al. (1995), can be used in many problems of optimal policy. If
the government can complete the markets with its policy instruments, all
the implementability constraints are summarized into one, and the vector
of state variables is not enlarged relative to the standard case, after period
1. Within our framework, this means that the co-state variables are
constant; in most models (such as examples 1 and 2 and the applications
12Our work provides a formal proof that introducing the co-state variables is suf-
ﬂcient for the optimal solution in Hansen, et al. (1985). It is not clear if the ap-
proach of Kydland and Prescott (1980) does provide an optimal solution in cases
with uncertainty.
17just cited), the co-state variables need to be introduced13.
Rustichini (1996) discusses a model similar to our example 1 and he
arti¯cially imposes the restriction that the solution depends only the nat-
ural state variables, in that case (k;!;µ). He de¯nes a map that delivers
a value function satisfying incentive constraints under this restriction. In
most models, the map de¯ned by this author does not reach the optimum
under full commitment, while our approach would. In those models, it
is precisely the introduction of the co-state variables that allows con-
sumption smoothing across periods (see our discussion of consumption
smoothing at the end of example 1); the solution computed by the ap-
proach of Rustichini (1996) would not allow to spread the compensations
for default over di®erent periods, but agents receive a single one-shot
compensation when they are tempted to default. Thus the optimum
under full commitment is not achieved.
The pioneer work of Abreu, et al. (1990) proposes to summarize
past histories in the function of promised utilities. This amounts to using
a function as a co-state variable, which still leaves for a fairly large state
space. In some cases, (see Green (1987), and Thomas and Worral (1990))
this function can be summarized into a few co-state variables14.T h i s
approach is used by Phelan and Townsend (1992). Our approach provides
a common framework that encompasses two-period constraints as well as
discounted sums other than discounted utilities (as is the case with some
present value budget constraints); it makes it possible to directly obtain
and characterize e±cient contracts on the Pareto frontier without having
to characterize the whole set of possible equilibria and, ultimately, as
we discussd in the introduction, to obtain fully recursive solutions, in
the sense that a time-invariant map is de¯ned and initial conditions are
13See, for example, Benhabib, et al. (1997) for an \optimal" tax policy derived
using non-constant co-state variables.
14See also Chang (1996) for a general disscussion, and an application to the de-
sign of credible monetary policies, of the APS approach, as well as the similar ap-
proach pioneered by Cronshaw and Luenberger (1994). See, for example, Sargent and
Ljungqvist (1998) and Sargent (1999) for some macroeconomic applications of the
approach of using ﬂrst backwards iteration of \future present values" (i.e., APS) and
then maximizing over the set of feasible {incentive compatible{ contracts.
18given. In contrast, using the APS approach, the initial value function
at time zero is not known and needs to be solved for separately. Having
to solve for the initial condition may lead to unstable outcomes, much
in the same way as with solving Euler equations by forward shooting.
Nevertheless, the APS approach is more suitable to characterize the set
of all incentive compatible contracts (i.e., sub-game perfect equilibria)
and (until the theory in this paper is not further developed) to study
problems with informational constraints.
3 Programs 1 and 2 and their duality
In this Section we study ¯rst Program 1 and show how, under suitable
assumptions, it has solutions, which have a Lagrangean formulation. The
underlying theory is well known (see, for example, Luenberger (1969))
and we extend it to cover constraints of the form (2). We then, study Pro-
gram 2 and show that, under appropriate conditions, there exist saddle-
point solutions. Treating Program 2 as a primitive program allows us to
develop a recursive theory that does not speci¯cally rely on Program 1.
Nevertheless, we show how to derive Program 2 from Program 1.W ee n d
the section with a global duality theorem linking both programs (which
requires convexity assumptions) and a su±ciency theorem showing that
Program 2 solutions are Program 1 solutions (with weaker convexity re-
quirements). We call Program 1 the Planner's Problem (PP)a n dPro-
gram 2 the Saddle Point Problem (SPP).
3.1 Program 1 (PP)
We ¯rst recall Program 1
PP







s.t. xt+1 = `(xt;a t;s t+1);a t 2 A(xt;s t);t ¸ 0( 1 a)
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5 ¸ 0; j =1 ;:::;k (2)
x0;s 0 given.
at St ¡ measurable
We make the following assumptions15,
A1. S is a compact (Borel) set of an Euclidean space. fstg;st 2S; is
a Markovian process satisfying the following (Feller) property: if
f : S !Ris bounded and continuous (i.e., f 2 C(S)), then E[fj¢]:
S !Ris also bounded and continuous (i.e., E[fj¢] 2 C(S))16.
A2. X is a compact subset of R‘; A(¢;s ) is a compact, convex val-
ued and continuous correspondence from X to Rm: Furthermore,
`(¢;¢;s ):X £R m ! X is continuous.17
A3. r(¢; ¢;s):R‘ £R m !Ris continuous and bounded. Furthermore,
¯ 2 (0;1).
A4. gj
n(¢; ¢;s ):R‘ £R m !R ;n =1 ;2;j =1 ;:::;k is continuous and
bounded.
A4b. gj
n(¢; ¢;s );n=1 ;2;j=1 ;:::;kand r(¢; ¢;s) are quasiconcave, and
the set of fatg satisfying (1a)i sc o n v e x18.
A5. There exists an ²>0 and, for all (x0;s 0); ap r o g r a mf^ ang satisfying
(1a) such that d(^ an;A(b xn;s n)c) ¸ " and19
g
j








2(^ xn; ^ an;s n)
3
5 ¸ ²
15We denote by St the ￿-ﬂeld generated by all possible sequences (s0;:::;s t).
16If the underlying transition kernel of fstg is Q, then E[fjs] ·
R
f(s0)Q(s;ds0).
17Our assumptions, such as A2, need only to be satisﬂed \for almost all s 2 S",
with respect to the probabilities deﬂned by the transition probability; i.e., Q(s;¢):
18This last condition is satiaﬂed if, for example, A(‘(x;¢;s );s ) has a convex graph
for all (x;s):
19As usual, the superindex c on a set denotes the complement of this set; d denotes
the Euclidian distance between a point and a set.
20where ^ xn+1 = `(^ xn; ^ an;s n+1) and, for each j =1 ;:::;k; either Nj =
1 or Nj =1 :
Assumptions A1 - A3 are standard in stochastic maximization
problems. Assumption A5 is a generalized version of a standard in-
teriority assumption. Assumption A4 corresponds to the new set of
constraints (2). It requires that the constraint set is well behaved (closed
and bounded) even when these constraints are taken into account. The
convexity assumption A4b is common in maximization problems, but
fairly restrictive in many applications with implementability constraints.
As we will see, this assumption is only required to obtain global dual-
ity results that guarantee the equivalence between solutions of PP and
solutions of SPP, but is not needed for many of our results20.I np a r t i c -
ular, Lagrangean multipliers may exist and value functions may be well
de¯ned even A4b is not satis¯ed (see, for example, Luenberger (1969)
and Stokey, et al. (1989)). In that case, solutions of a Lagrangean are
also solutions to the maximization problem.
The in¯nite-dimensional formulation of PP
We can describe, more compactly, PP as a maximal problem in
L1. Given an initial condition (x0;s 0), let
f(a)=E 0
P1
t=0 ¯tr(xt;a t;s t)
s.t. xt = `(xt¡1;a t¡1;s t)f o rt>0




























s.t. for t>0;x t = `(xt¡1;a t¡1;s t)
20In particular, unless it is explicitly mentioned, we will not make such assumption;
e.g., A1-A5 means A1,A2,A3,A4 and A5.




This is a standard maximization problem in L1, the following proposi-
tion shows that our assumptions guarantee the existence of a solution to
(PP).
Proposition 1 Assume A1-A3, A4 and A5. There exists a program
a⁄ which solves PP with initial condition (x0;s 0).
Before proving the ¯rst proposition, it is convenient to be more ex-
plicit with respect to the underlying commodity space. By A1, there is a
well de¯ned probability space (S1;S1;P). If Lm
1(S1;St;P)d e n o t e st h e
space of m-valued {essentially bounded{ St-measurable functions, then
the contract space is A =fa : 8t ¸ 0;a t 2L m
1(S1;St;P)g: The contract
space, A, has a product structure. We consider the product topology,
characterized by having every projection {say, to Lm
1(S1;St;P){ with
its corresponding topology. For example, when we refer to the weak⁄-
t o po l o g y ,w em e a nt h a ts u c ht o po l o g yi sc o n s i d e r e di na n yp r oj e c t i o n( i . e . ,
the ¾(L1; L1) topology on L1(S1; St;P))21.W ew i l lm a k eu s eo ft h e
topology of convergence in probability,d e n o t e dP-topology. 22 An impor-
tant feature of the P-topology is that, with this topology, L1(S1; St;P)
is a complete metric space23.
Proof: By assumption A5 there are feasible solutions. Given assump-
tions A1, A2 and A4, it is easy to see that the set fa 2A : g(a) ¸
21Our approach extends to the more general case where, for every t>0, at 2 At
and At is an arbitrary linear space, provided that A1-A5 are appropriately modiﬂed
as to guarantee that a solution to PP (or SPP) exists. Our approach relies on the
time separability of the objective function and of the constraint sets (or some weaker
time recursive form of these maps) and, therefore, does not depend on the speciﬂc
topological structure of Lm
1.
22A metric dp can be deﬂned on L1(S1; St;P)b ydp(x; ^ x)=
R jx¡^ xj
1+jx¡^ xjP(ds): This
metric induces the topology of convergence in probability.
23See, for example, (Neveu (1970), Pr. II 3-4).
220g is closed and totally bounded with respect to the P-topology (i.e.,
for any ²>0, it can be covered with a ¯nite number of spheres of
radius ²). Since the P-topology de¯nes a complete metric space, it
follows (see, Dunford and Schwartz (1957), Theorem I.6.15, p.22)
that fa 2A : g(a) ¸ 0g is compact. By assumptions A2 & A3
r(¢;¢;¢) is uniformly integrable, therefore f(¢)i sc o n t i n u o u sw i t h
respect to the P-topology. It follows that a maximal element, a⁄,
exists.¥
This proposition shows that PP has a well de¯ned value. However,
more than in the existence of solutions, we are interested in their char-
acterization and, in particular, in attaining a recursive formulation. To
this end, we study ¯rst the Lagrangean structure of PP.A ni n t e r e s t i n g
feature of PP is that g: A!L 1 and, as it is well known, the positive
orthant of L1 has a non empty interior, as it is required for a standard
separation argument24.
Proposition 2 Assume A1- A4, A4b & A5.L e ta⁄ be a solution to
PP with initial condition (x0;s 0). There exist a ~ °
⁄ 2L 1 such that the
lagrangean
L(a; ~ °)=f(a)+~ °g(a)
has a saddle point at (a⁄; ~ °
⁄), i.e.,
L(a
⁄; ~ °) ¸ L(a
⁄; ~ °
⁄) ¸ L(a; ~ °
⁄)( 1 2 )
for all a 2A and ~ ° 2L 1;+. Furthermore, V (x0;s 0)=L(a⁄; ~ °
⁄):
Proof See Appendix 1.
24Even if a standard separation argument can not be applied, because the assump-
tions underlying PP are not satisﬂed, it may be possible to extend our approach,
as long as Lagrange multipliers are well deﬂned (and summable). This can be the
case when g(¢) maps into a more general space {say, using separation arguments as in
Mas-Colell and Zame (1991) { or when the problem is not a global convex problem
and Lagrange multipliers are for example derived as dual variables in a smooth local
optimization problem (see the Remark following Theorem 2).
233.2 Program 2 (SPP)
In this subsection we take Program 2 as our primitive program and show
the existence of solutions. Program 2 is a Saddle Point Problem (SPP)
and, given arbitrary initial conditions (x0;¹ 0;s 0) (i.e., in this Section we
do not constrain ¹0 = 0), its value {possibly, in¯nity{ is W(x0;¹ 0;s 0):
SPP









th(xt;a t;¹ t;° t;s t)
)
s.t. xt+1 = `(xt;a t;s t+1);a t 2 A(xt;s t);t ¸ 0( 1 a)
¹t+1 = '(¹t;° t;s t+1);° t ¸ 0;t ¸ 0( 3 )
(x0;¹ 0;s0) given.
(at;° t);St ¡ measurable
We make the following assumptions, in addition to A1-A2,
B1. h(¢; ¢; ¢¢;s ) is continuous; h(¢; ¢;¹ ;° ;s )i sb o u n d e da n dh is of the
form
h(x; a;¹; °; s) ´ h0(x; a; s)+°h1(x; a; s)+¹h2(x; a; s)
Furthermore, ¯ 2 (0;1)25
B1b. h(¢; ¢; ¢; ¢;s ) is quasiconcave, and the set of fatg satisfying (1a)i s
convex .
B2. Exists an ²>0 and, for all (x0;s 0); ap r o g r a mf^ ang satisfying
(1a)s u c ht h a td(^ an;A(b xn;s n)c) ¸ " and
h
j








2(^ xn; ^ an;s n)
3
5 ¸ ²
25We use the notation „h2(x;a; s) to denote
Pk
j=1 „j[h2(x; a; s)]j.
24where ^ xn+1 = `(^ xn; ^ an;s n+1). For j =1 ;:::;k; either Nj = 1;
in which case 'j(¹; °; s)=¹j + °j; or Nj =1 , in which case
'j(¹; °; s)=°j:
As we will see in the next subsection (and should be clear from
Section 2), when Program 2 is obtained from Program 1, assumptions
B1-B2 are satis¯ed whenever Program 1 satis¯es A3-A5.
Given an initial condition (x0;¹0;s0), it is also possible to write SPP
in a more compact form by letting
H(a;°)=E 0
P1
t=0¯th(xt;a t;¹ t;° t;s t)
s.t. for t>0;x t = `(xt¡1;a t¡1;s t)a n d¹t = '(¹t¡1;° t¡1;s t)
q(a) t = d(at;A(xt;s t)c)
s.t. for t>0;x t = `(xt¡1;a t¡1;s t)
With this notation, the saddle point problem takes the form





We will also use the value function decomposition










t [°th1(xt;a t;s t)+¹th2(xt;a t;s t)]
which leads to the following decomposition
W(x; ¹; s) ´ W0(x; ¹; s)+W1(x; ¹; s)
25When SPP is derived from PP, then Propositions 1 and 2 guaran-
tee the existence of solutions to SPP. Nevertheless, we are interested in
treating SPP as a primitive problem. The following proposition shows
that, with assumptions A1-A2 and B1-B1b-B2, SPP has a solution
and the existence result follows from a ¯xed point theorem. As in the
existence of Nash equilbria, convexity is a necessary condition for the
application of -a generalized version of- Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem,
but, as in games, solutions may exist even when convexity fails (see Ap-
pendix 1 for its proof, as well as for the proof of its Corollary)26.
Proposition 3 Assume A1-A2 and B1-B1b-B2. Given initial condi-
tions (x0;¹ 0;s 0), there exists a solution (a⁄; °⁄) to SPP. Furthermore,
all solutions to SPP have value W(x0;¹ 0;s 0).
The following corollary provides bounds on multipliers and it is
of particular interest for developing a recursive formulations, as well as
computational solutions. Assumption B2 plays a key role, while it does
not rely on the convexity assumption B1b.
Corollary to Proposition 3. Assume A1-A2 and B1-B2.L e t( a⁄; °⁄)
be a solution to SPP. There exist a positive constant ¹ K such that
(a⁄; °⁄) satis¯es k°⁄kﬂ < ¹ K ¢maxf1;k¹0kg.
3.3 Duality
We ¯nish this Section by relating Program 1 and Program 2. Theorem 1
provides a duality theorem for recursive contracts in which we derive SPP
from PP using Proposition 2, which requires the convexity assumption
A4b. Theorem 2 is a su±ciency theorem for recursive contracts:S P P
solutions are PP solutions. This second theorem exploits the fact that
SPP can be derived from PP even when the global convexity assumptions
(of Theorem 1) are not satis¯ed (as long as summable multipliers exist).
26We let k￿kﬂ =
P1
t=0 ﬂt k￿tk:
26We now make it clear how to derive SPP from PP. To this end,







































































t with ~ °
j
t¯¡t and applying the law of iterated expectations. The
third follows from simple algebra and taking '(¹; °; s)=¹+° if Nj = 1
and '(¹; °; s)=° if Nj =1 : Now identify h
j
0(¢) with r(¢) and let ¹0 =0 ,
then it follows that H0(a)=f(a)a n dH1(a; °)+ ~ °
0q(a)=~ °g(a);
where ~ °0
t is the lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint
q(a)t ¸ 0: This shows how an SPP satisfying B1-B1b-B2 can be derived
from PP.
Theorem 1. Let PP, with initial condition (x0;s 0), satisfy A1{A4,
A4b & A5.T h eSPP (derived from PP) with initial condition
(x0; 0;s 0) satis¯es A1{A2 and B1-B1b-B2. Furthermore, a⁄ is a
solution to PP if and only if there exist °⁄ and (a⁄;°⁄)i sas o l u t i o n
to SPP (derived from PP); that is, W(x0; 0;s 0)=V (x0;s 0).
Proof : The proof consist on deriving PP from SPP, assembling the
results of the last two subsections and applying Lagrange Duality
theory (see, for example, Luenberger (1969), 8.6, Theorem 1). In
particular, the theorem follows from four basic facts:
i. a⁄ is a solution to PP, with initial condition (x0;s 0), if and only
if a⁄ is a solution of supg(a)‚0f(a)( w h e nf and g are de¯ned with
respect to the initial condition (x0;s 0)).
27ii. maxg(a)‚0f(a)=m i n ~ ￿2L1;+ maxa2A [f(a)+~ °g(a)]
iii. min~ ￿2L1;+ maxa2A [f(a)+~ °g(a)] = min￿‚0maxq(a)‚0H(a; °)
iv. (a⁄; °⁄)i sas o l u t i o nt oSPP, with initial condition (x0; 0;s 0), if
and only if (a⁄; °⁄) is a solution of inf￿‚0supq(a)‚0 H(a; °)
The ¯rst and the fourth fact are immediate from our constructions
in the last two subsections. The second fact is the Lagrange Duality
result, when a solution a⁄ exists (which it does by Proposition 1).
To see the third fact notice that, by Proposition 2, when (a⁄; °⁄)






. Furthermore, given the convexity and interiority assumptions on re-
source constraints one can also show that, for the maximization part of
H(a; °⁄); there is a multiplier associated with such constraint (a version
of Proposition 2 for the max part of SPP). That is, H(a; °)+ ~ °
0q(a)
de¯nes a Lagrangian for SPP. It follows that, with the previous identi¯-
cation of maps and multipliers, it is also possible to go from SPP to the
Lagrange formulation of PP.¥
3.4 Su±ciency
Theorem 1 assumes convexity (i.e., A4b) to guarantee that there exist
an appropriate multiplier, however, as long as SPP has a solution then
it is a solution to the PP problem. Proposition 3 assumes convexity (i.e.,
B1b) to guarantee the existence of a solution to SPP, however, it is
not a necessary condition for existence of solutions to SPP. The follow-
ing su±ciency theorem does not rely in any convexity assumption and,
therfore, can be a starting point for problems whose SPP formulation is
known to have a solution.
Theorem 2. Given initial conditions (x0; 0;s 0), let (a⁄; °⁄)b eas o l u -
tion to SPP.T h e na⁄ is a solution to PP. Furthermore, W(x0; 0;s 0)=
V (x0;s 0).
28Proof: The proof is an extension, to SPP, of a su±ciency theorem
for Lagrangian saddle points (see, for example, Luenberger (1969),
Theorem 8.5.2, p.221). First notice that since ¹0 =0( a n dw i t h
the simple algebra used in the proof of Theorem 1)

























By minimality of °⁄; for every ° ¸ 0;
H1(a
⁄; °
⁄ + °) ¸H1(a
⁄; °
⁄)

















t+n;s t+n) ¸ 0
Identifying, as in the proof of Theorem 1, gj
m with hj
m;m=1 ;2; and
noticing that, by the de¯nition of SPP, q(a⁄) ¸ 0,t h ep r e v i o u s






which, together with °⁄ ¸ 0a n dg(a⁄) ¸ 0i m p l yt h a tH1(a⁄; °⁄)=0 :
Now suppose, there exist ~ a satisfying g(~ a) ¸ 0a n df(~ a) >f(a⁄);
then {identifying f with H0-i tmust be that





which contradicts the maximality of a⁄ for the SPP.¥
294 Dynamic {saddle point{ programming
Our main interest, however, is not in the existence of a solution to SPP,
but in showing that solutions to SPP can have a recursive structure. We
say that a function ^ W : X £ MU £ S !Rsatis¯es the saddle point
functional equation (SPFE) corresponding to (SPP) if and only if:











0 = `(x; a; s
0)a n d¹
0 = '(¹; °; s
0)
We derive the existence and uniqueness of a solution to SPFE
adapting and extending the contraction mapping approach. As in maxi-
mization of dynamic problems, other approaches can be used to show the
existence of a value function satisfying SPFE,b u t ,a sw ew i l ls e e ,g i v e n
our underlying assumptions, there is no loss of generality in using the
contraction mapping approach. To apply it, we must ¯rst de¯ne an ap-
propriate space of functions. We exploit the fact that the value function
of SPP inherits from the function h the following quasi-linear structure:
W(x; ¹; s)=W0(x;¹; s)+W1(x; ¹; s), with W0(x;¢;s )h o m o g e n e o u s
of degree zero and W1(x;¢;s ) homogeneous of degree one, therefore we
constraint our search to functions satisfying this property. The main dif-
¯culty with the contraction mapping approach in our context is that the
°'s and ¹'s are unbounded and, because of homogeneity of degree one of
W1; t h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gv a l u ef u n c t i o nm u s ta l s ob eu n b o u n d e d .W ed e ¯ n e
a sequence of contraction mappings, parameterized by a bound K on k°k
. We then show that, with the assumptions of the last subsection, the
SPFE has solutions (Proposition 4) and that the contraction theorem
applies to our space of functions, for any K (Proposition 5). Finally, we
use the fact that whenever the SPP has a solution the °'s are bounded
to show the correspondence between SPFE and SPP (Theorem 3), and
we end the Section collecting our results, which allows to relate SPFE
and PP (Theorem 4).
30We ¯rst de¯ne the space of \value" functions,
M = fW : X £R k
+ £ S !R s.t.
i) W(¢;¢;¢)=W0(¢;¢;¢)+W1(¢;¢;¢)a n d8¸>0
W0(¢;¸¹;¢)=W0(¢;¹;¢)and W1(¢;¸¹;¢)=¸W1(¢;¹;¢)
ii) Wj(¢; ¢;s )is continuous and bounded k =0 ;1g
The space M is a normed vector space with the norm
kWk =s u pfjW(x;¹;s)j : k¹k·1;x2 X;s 2 Sg
In Appendix 2 we show that M is a nonempty and complete metric
space (Lemma 1)27.
We ¯rst ¯x an arbitrary positive constant K and let K„ =m a xfK;K k¹kg:
We de¯ne the operator TK on M by









0 = `(x; a; s
0)a n d¹
0 = '(¹; °; s
0)
If a solution to SPP exists (e.g., by Proposition 3) and if, as we
postulate below, W corresponds to the value function of SPP then we
can replace \infsup" by \minmax."28. We now study the properties of
TK (see Appendix 2). In particular, that TK : M ! M (Lemma 2) and
that it satis¯es Blackwell's conditions of monotonicity (Lemma 3) and
discounting (Lemma 4). It is then easy to show that these conditions im-
ply that the TK operator satis¯es the contraction property and, therefore,
has a unique ¯xed point. More precisely,
27See also Alvarez and Stokey (1995) for similar arguments extending the contrac-
tion mapping approach to homogeneous maps.
28We can also show directly (by similar arguments than the ones used in Proposition
3) that SPFE has a solution, for W 2 M, by assuming A1-A2 and B1-B1b-B2 and
that Wj(¢; ¢;s ) is quasi-concave, k =0 ;1.
31Proposition 4 Assume A1-A2 and B1-B2. TK : M ! M is a con-
traction mapping.
Proof: (See Appendix 2).
The value function W = TK W,d e ¯ n e sapolicy map29 ÃK such
that, if (a;°) 2 ÃK(x; ¹; s), then for x0 = `(x; a; s)a n d¹0 = '(¹; °; s0),




We say that ÃK generates the program (a⁄;°⁄) from the initial con-
ditions (x0;¹ 0;s 0) if for all n ¸ 0a n d( s0;:::;s n), (a⁄
n;° ⁄





0)=( x0;¹ 0), x⁄
n+1 =`(x⁄
n;a ⁄




As usual, the fact that TK is a contraction guarantees existence and
uniqueness of a unique W that is a ¯xed point of this mapping, and that
iterations on this mapping converge to it.
Theorem 3. Let SPP, satisfying A1-A2 and B1-B2, have a solution.
a) If W :X£Rk
+£S !Ris the value function of SPP, then there
exist a ¹ K such that, for all K ¸ ¹ K, TKW = W . b)I f( a⁄;°⁄)i s
generated by ÃK from (x0;¹ 0;s 0) and, for all t, k°⁄
tk <K „⁄
t,t h e n
(a⁄;°⁄) solves (SPP) with initial conditions (x0;¹ 0;s 0):
Proof: We ¯rst show that W 2 M: That it can be decomposed {as in







































´ W0(x0;¹ 0;s 0)+W1(x0;¹ 0;s 0)
29It can also be shown, using standard arguments, that the correspondence ˆ is
upper-hemi-continuous and, therefore, has a measurable selection (see, for example,
Stokey, et al. (1989) ; in particular, Theorem 7.6 p.184).
32Given this decomposition, to show that W satis¯es the homogeneity
properties of (i) it su±ces to show that, for any ¸>0; \(a⁄; °⁄)
is a solution to SPP with initial conditions (x;¹;s) if and only if
(a⁄;¸°⁄) is a solution to SPP with initial conditions (x;¸¹;s):"
We now prove this claim.
Denote by (a⁄(¸); °⁄(¸)) a solution to SPP with initial conditions







































































The ¯rst equality follows from the same argument used in the proof
of Theorem 2, regarding the saddle point nature of (a⁄(¸); °⁄(¸))
(i.e., H1(a⁄; °⁄)=¹h2(x;a⁄
0)); the ¯rst inequality from the maxi-
mality of a⁄(¸);the second inequality from the minimality of °⁄(¸0)
and the fact that, in fact, H0 does not depend on °⁄, and, again, the
last equality follows from the saddle point nature of (a⁄(¸0); °⁄(¸0)):
Since these inequalities are satis¯ed for arbitrary ¸>0a n d¸0 > 0,
it follows that, for ¯xed (x;¹;s);a⁄(¸)=a⁄(1) (more precisely, that
a⁄(¸) is a maximal element of SPP with initial conditions (x;¹;s)
)
To see that °⁄(¸)=¸°⁄(1) (more precisely, that ¸¡1°⁄(¸)i sa










































where, the ¯rst inequality follows from the minimality of °⁄(¸);
the second inequality from the previous identity a⁄(¸)=a⁄(1);the
second inequality from the minimality of °⁄(1); the third equality
from the homogeneity properties of H; and the last equality follows,
again, from the previous identity: a⁄(¸)=a⁄(1):
A standard generalization of the maximum principle shows the con-
tinuity of Wk(¢; ¢;s );while its boundedness is inherited from the hj
functions. Therefore, W 2 M:
Now let ¹ K be the constant of Corollary to Proposition 3, then
by this Corollary, for K ¸ ¹ K, if (a⁄; °⁄) is a solution to SPP
with initial conditions (x;¹;s);thenk°⁄kﬂ <K „, which implies that
k°⁄
0k <K „: Similarly, at (x⁄
t;¹ ⁄
t;s t);the bound on SPP implies that
k°⁄
tk <K „⁄
t: It follows that, for K ¸ ¹ K , the bound on TK is not
binding for SPP solutions. Uniqueness of the contraction map
guarantees that TKW = W .
To see the second part of the theorem, let (a⁄;°⁄) be generated
by ÃK0 from (x0;¹ 0;s 0);then for some c W 2 M, c W(x0;¹ 0;s 0)=
TKc W(x0;¹ 0;s 0)f o ra l lK ¸ K0 since, by assumption, for all t, k°⁄
tk
<K „⁄
t.B u tb y( a), for K ¸ K, TKW = W;where;W is the value
function of SPP. By uniqueness, it follows that W(x0;¹ 0;s 0)=






t;s t): That is, (a⁄;°⁄)i s
a solution to SPP with initial conditions (x0;¹ 0;s 0):¥
344.1 A ¯nal theorem
We are ¯nally in a position to recast our results in a comprehensive
theorem, which follows from the previous results, in particular, Theorems
1-3, and relates SPFE and PP.
Theorem 4. a) Let PP satisfy A1-A3, A4 & A5 and derive the cor-
responding SPP.I ft h e r ee x i s taK and a (a⁄;°⁄) generated (from
initial conditions (x0; 0;s 0)) by a policy ÃK corresponding to a
value function W satisfying SPFE, with the property that, for all
t;k°⁄
tk <K „⁄
t, then a⁄ solves PP with initial conditions (x0;s 0);
and value V (x0;s 0); Furthermore, W (x0; 0;s 0)=V (x0;s 0):
b) Assume A1-A2 and A3, A4, A4b & A5. PP has a solu-
tion, and if a⁄ solves PP with initial conditions (x0;s 0); and value
V (x0;s 0); then there exist a K and a (a⁄;°⁄) generated by a policy
ÃK (with initial conditions (x0;0;s 0)) derived from a value function
W satisfying SPFE, with the property that, for all t;k°⁄
tk <K „⁄
t:
Furthermore, W (x0; 0;s 0)=V (x0;s 0):
Proof: a) By construction, the corresponding SPP satis¯es A1-A2 and
B1-B2. Let (a⁄;°⁄) be generated from ÃK , with the bounds K„⁄
t
never binding, then by Theorem 3, (a⁄;°⁄) solves SPP, with initial
conditions (x0;0;s 0) and, by Theorem 2 , a⁄ is a solution to PP
satisfying W (x0; 0;s 0)= V (x0;s 0).
b) That PP has a solution follows from Proposition 1. If a⁄ solves
PP with initial conditions (x0;s 0) and we assume A1-A4, A4b &
A5, by Theorem 1 there exist a °⁄ such that (a⁄;°⁄)i sas o l u t i o n
to a SPP (derived from PP) with initial conditions (x0;0;s 0). By
Theorem 3 the value function of SPP, W,s a t i s ¯ e sS P F Ef o rK ¸ ¹ K
and TKW = W. Therefore, there exist a policy map ÃK generating
(a⁄;°⁄): ¥
In summary, as we have discussed, many economic problems take
t h eP Pf o r m .W eh a v es h o w nh o wt ot r a n s f o r mt h e mi nt h eS P Pf o r m
and we have provided conditions guaranteeing the existence of solutions
35to SPP, and -weaker- condirions, under which, a solution to SPP is also a
solution to PP. More interestingly from a computational point of view, we
have also shown that, under our assumptions, all SPP solutions satisfy a
saddle point functional equation (SPFE). That is, in applications of our
theory one only has to check that PP satis¯es our conditions (i.e., A1-A3,
A4 & A5) to be able to guarantee by Theorem 4a) that the solution of
SPFE is a solution to the original PP problem. In fact, we provide condi-
tions guaranteeing that any SPP solution can be achieved as a solution to
SPFE. With global convexity assumptions (i.e., assuming A4b too), we
c a nb es u r et h a tall PP solutions can be found by solving SPFE, without
such convexity assumptions it may be that there are solutions to PP that
are not solutions to the corresponding SPP formulation. Nevertheless,
provided that SPP has a solution, then the maximal value V (x0;s 0)i s
achieved by our recursive characterization in terms of a SPFE..
5 Conclusions and extensions
We have shown that a large class of problems with implementability
constraints can be analyzed by an equivalent recursive saddle point prob-
lem. This saddle point problem obeys a saddle point functional equation,
which is a version of the Bellman equation. This approach works for a
very large class of models with incentive constraints, limits in the budget
constraint, optimal policy, optimal regulation, etc. This means that a
uni¯ed framework can be provided to analyze all these models. Instead
of having to write optimal contracts as history-dependent contracts one
can write them as a stationary function of few state (and co-state) vari-
ables. This means, for example, that the time-inconsistency problem
does not complicate considerably the numerical solution to this problem,
only a few co-state variables need to be added, and computation of the
solution is greatly simpli¯ed.
Our current research aims at relaxing the assumption of full infor-
mation, developing in detail some computational aspects of this method,
and exploring a range of applications to several models, including strate-
36gic dynamic behavior, optimal policy and borrowing under incomplete
insurance.
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38APPENDIX 1 (Proofs of Section 3)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2The existence of a functional °⁄
b 2 ba+ that
satis¯es
L(a
⁄; °b): ¸: L(a
⁄; °
⁄
b): ¸: L(a; °
⁄
b)( 1 3 )
for all a 2Aand °b 2 ba+ follows from the standard theory of
constrained optimization in linear vector spaces (see, for example,
(Luenberger (1969), Section 8.3, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1)). To
obtain this result we make use of the following facts: i) as o l u -
tion to PP exists (Proposition 1); ii) as we already mentioned, by
assumptions A4 and A5 g(¢)m a p si n t oL1 and L1;+ has a non
empty interior; iii) by assumption A3, f(¢)i sc o n t i n u o u sa n dq u a -
siconcave, and iv) by assumption A5, a Slater interiority condition
is satis¯ed.
We have to show that inequalities (13) are also satis¯ed with mul-
tipliers that are countably additive (i.e., in L1;+).
G i v e na ni n i t i a lc o n d i t i o n( x0;s 0), we can model the exogenous
uncertainty as an in¯nite branching process from s0. Abusing no-
tation, let (for the remaining of the proof) S0 = fs0g and St be the
s e to fp o s s i b l ev a l u e so fst following s0.I ft h e r ea r en = k +1con-
straints in period t,l e tZ = [1
0 (St£n). Since, by assumption A1,
fstg is a Markovian process, there is a well de¯ned measure space
(Z; Z;º ). That is, g : A!L1(Z; Z;º ), and °b 2 ba+(Z; Z;º ).
Let °b;t(A)=°(A \ (St £ n)).
Second, we recall some mathematical facts (already used in Bewley
(1972)). By Yosida-Hewitt decomposition, given ° 2 ba+,t h e r e
exist unique °c;t ¸ 0a n d°p;t ¸ 0 such that °c;t is countable additive
and °p;t is purely ¯nitely, satisfying: °b;t = °c;t +°p;t. Furthermore,
for every ²t > 0, there exist At 2Z ,s u c ht h a t°c;t(At) <² t and
°p;t(Z n At) = 0. It follows that, if fs : a
(n)
t (s) 6= at(s)gµZ n
A
(n)




t ! 0( a sn !1 ;w h i c hc a nb ea c h i e v e db ya n
appropriate choice of f²
(n)
t g), then limn°c(fs : a(n)(s) 6= a(s)g =
0 and, if f(¢) is continuous in probability (i.e., in the P-topology),
then f(a(n)) ! f(a).
39We now use these facts, and the interiority assumption A5,t os h o w
that °⁄
c is, in fact, a supporting Lagrange multiplier.
Consider ¯rst the left inequality of (13). Since g(a⁄) ¸ 0; it follows
that °⁄
bg(a⁄) = 0. In the Yosida-Hewitt decomposition both terms
are nonnegative, therefore °⁄
cg(a⁄) = 0. On the other hand, for all
° 2L 1+; °g(a⁄) ¸ 0;. These last two facts show the left inequality
of the saddle point condition (12).
Now we show the right inequality of (12). Suppose for some a 2A ,
f(a)+°⁄
cg(a) >f (a⁄)+°⁄






where the sets A
(n)
r are ordered {according to the branching stochas-
tic process starting from s0{ and satisfy the above Hewitt-Yosida
decomposition conditions. Let F
(n)
0 = ;. Then, a new contract
a(n) can be de¯ned by a
(n)





at(s)i f s= 2 F
(n)
t






r=0 is the interior program {of assumption A5{






The inequality follows from the fact that °p ¸ 0 and on sets with
purely ¯nitely positive measure the program is, by construction,
interior. The convergence property follows from the P-continuity
of f, the boundness assumption A4 and the construction of a(n).






which contradicts (13) and proves that the saddle point condition
(12) is satis¯ed (with °⁄
c).






40where the ¯rst equality follows from the fact, already proved, that
°⁄
bg(x⁄)=°⁄
cg(x⁄) = 0 and the second equality follows by de¯nition¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :Our goal is to show the existence of a solution
to the following problem:
SPP





We ¯x the initial conditions (x0;¹ 0;s 0) and proceed in two steps.
First we show that if we further restrict the set of feasible ° se-
quences, the corresponding SPPm problem has a solution, and
second we show that, with our interiority assumptions, such a re-











Before we proceed, we collect a couple of facts that we will use in the
proof. i) if an ! a, in probability, then, given an initial condition
(x0;s 0); xn ! x in probability, where, xn




t ;s t+1);w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tfhj(xn
t ;a n
t )g!
fhj(xt;a t)g;j=0 ;1;2i nt h eP-topology; ii) by (the second part
of) B2 if k°k·m k'(¹;° ; s)k· m+ k¹k:
We now decompose the problem as
R1(°)=m a x q(a)‚0 H(a; °)
and
R2
m(a)=m i n f￿:￿‚0a n dk￿k•mg H(a; °)
We ¯rst consider the existence of maximal elements a⁄ 2 R1(°) ½
L1 By assumption B2 the set of feasible solutions is nonempty.
By assumptions A1 and A2, and following the same argument
41that in the proof of Proposition 1, fa :q(a) ¸ 0g is compact in
the P-topology. By fact (i) H(¢; °)i sP-continuous, whenever
f(¯t;¯t°t;¯t¹t)g2L 1; which, by fact (i), it is the case if k°k·m;
therefore, R1(°) is non-empty. Now, consider the existence of
minimal elements °⁄ 2 R2
m(a). Given that ¯ 2 (0;1);the set n
(¯t;¯t°t;¯t¹t):k°kﬂ · m and k¹kﬂ · M
o
is norm bounded, point-
wise closed and convex. i.e., it is ¾(L1; L1) compact. Furthermore,
given (a;x) 2L 1,f o rj =0 ;1;2, fhj(xt;a t)g2L 1. It follows that
H(a; ¢)i s( ¾(L1; L1)) continuous in °,a n dt h a tR2
m(°)i sn o n -
empty. Compactness of the constraint sets and the continuity and
quasiconcavity properties of H(¢; ¢)( f o r¯ x e d( x0;¹ 0;s 0)), imply
that Rm(¢;¢) ´ (R1(¢);R 2
m(¢)) is a convex-valued upper-hemi con-
tinuous correspondence (i.e, has a closed graph) mapping a convex,
compact set in itself. It follows from a ¯xed point theorem that
there exist (a⁄; °⁄) 2 Rm(a⁄; °⁄):
Now, we show that for large m,( a⁄; °⁄) is also a ¯xed point of the
untruncated problem.
Let ^ a (and the corresponding ^ x ) be the interior program of as-














th1(^ xt; ^ at)+¯¹
⁄











⁄) ¡ H(^ a; °
⁄)
· H(a










t) ¡ h0(^ xt; ^ at)] + ¹0[h2(x0;a
⁄


















· B ¢ maxf1;k¹0kg ¡ ²jj°
⁄jjﬂ
The ¯rst inequality follows from the maximality of a⁄; the sec-
ond from minimality of °⁄;the third from the previous inequalities,
and from the boundedness assumption B1. Therefore, jj°⁄jjﬂ ·
maxf1;k¹0kgB=².
Now let m ¸ maxf1;k¹0kg ¹ K ´ maxf1;k¹0kg2B=²,a n d( a⁄; °⁄) 2
Rm(a⁄; °⁄): Suppose there exist a ~ ° ¸ 0;jj~ °jjﬂ >m ;satisfy-
ing H(a⁄; °⁄) >H (a⁄; ~ °): Let ¹ ° ¸0 be such that, for all t ¸ 0
¹ °t = ®°⁄
t +( 1¡ ®)~ °t,f o rs o m e® 2 (0; 1), and jj¹ °jjﬂ · m: But
then, by B2
H(a⁄; °⁄) ¡ H(a⁄; ¹ °)
=( 1 ¡ ®)[H(a⁄; °⁄) ¡ H(a⁄; ¹ °)]
> 0
and this contradicts the fact that °⁄ 2 R2
m(a⁄):
Finally, to see the uniqueness of the value. Let (a⁄; °⁄)a n d( a0; °0)
be two solutions to SPP, then by applying the saddle point prop-













Proof of Corollary to Proposition 3: It follows from the proof to
Proposition 3 that, if assumptions there exist a ¹ K such that the
solution (a⁄; °⁄)t oSPP satis¯es k°⁄kﬂ < ¹ K ¢maxf1;k¹0kg¥
APPENDIX 2 (Proofs of Section 4)
Lemma 1. M is a nonempty complete metric space.
43Proof: That it is non-empty is trivial. That every Cauchy sequence
fWng2M converges to a function ~ W satisfying ii) follows from
standard arguments (see, for example, Stokey, et al. (1989), The-
orem 3.1 and Lemma 9.5); these arguments apply to both compo-
nents W n
j ;j=0 ;1. To see that the homogeneity properties are
also satis¯ed, for any (x; ¹; s)a n d¸>0, let ¸0 =1a n d¸1=¸,
then, for j =0 ;1,
jW j(x; ¸¹; s) ¡ ¸jWj(x; ¹; s)j
= jW j(x; ¸¹; s) ¡ W j
n(x; ¸¹; s)+¸jW j
n(x; ¹; s) ¡ ¸jW j(x; ¹; s)j
·j W j(x; ¸¹; s) ¡ Wj
n(x; ¸¹; s)j + ¸jjWj
n(x; ¹; s) ¡ Wj(x; ¹; s)j
! 0
¥

























k(TKW)(x; ¹; s)k·k h0(x; a




























It follows that the boundedness condition of ii) is satis¯ed. A
routine generalization of the maximum principle (see, for example,
Stokey, et al.,1989) to this saddle point case, shows that (TW)(¢; ¢;s )
is continuous. To see that the homogeneity properties are satis-





‚,t h e n

































=( TW)0(x; ¹; s)+¸(TW)1(x; ¹; s)
¥
Lemma 3 (monotonicity) Let F; G 2 Mb es u c ht h a tF · G,t h e n
(TKF) · (TKG).
Proof Fix (¹; x; s), then for any ¹0 satisfying ¹0 = '(¹; °; s) ¸ 0,
max
a2A(x;s)



















fh(x;a;¹;°; s)+¯EG(`(x; a; s);'(¹; °; s);s
0)g
¥
In our context, if F 2 M and a 2R ,w ed e ¯ n et h ef u n c t i o nF +a 2
M by (F + a)(x; ¹; s)=F(x; ¹; s)+a.
Lemma 4 (discounting) For all W 2 M,a n da 2R +, TK(W + a) ·
TKW + ¯a.
Proof First notice that, for any (x; ¹; s)a n d° ¸ 0,
max
a2A(x;s)








fh(x;a;¹;°; s)+¯EW(`(x; a; s);'(¹; °; s);s
0)g + ¯a
Now, using this equalities and the above de¯nition for F + a,













+¯EW(`(x; a; s);'(¹; °; s);s
0)g + ¯a
=( TKW + ¯a)(x;¹; s)
We have shown that TK(W + a) · TKW + ¯a¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :The argument is standard. We show that
the contraction property is satis¯ed. Let F;G 2 M, then, using
the homogeneity property of the functions in M, for any (x; ¹; s),
F(x; ¹; s)=G(x; ¹; s)+[ F(x; ¹; s) ¡ G(x; ¹; s)]
· G(x; ¹; s)+jF(x; ¹; s) ¡ G(x; ¹; s)j
That is, F · G+jjF¡Gjj.B yt h emonotonicity and the discounting
properties, it follows that TKF · TKG + ¯jjF ¡ Gjj. But now,
reversing the roles of F and G we obtain that
jjTKF ¡ TKGjj · ¯jjF ¡ Gjj
Since 0 <¯<1w eh a v et h a tTK is a contraction mapping.
APPENDIX 3 (A1-A5 in examples 1 and 2)
Example 1
It is easy to check that, with more structure on the model, as-
sumptions A1{A4, A4b & A5 are all satis¯ed. For A1 we only need to
assume that the support of (µt;! t) is contained in a bounded set for all
t. The Feller property is satis¯ed, for example, under the usual cases
46that fµt;! tg1
t=0 takes only discrete values or the conditional distribution
of (µt;! t) conditional on (µt¡1;! t¡1) is continuous with respect to the
latter. For the next assumptions, if 0 <±<1;F: R+ £R!R + and
limk!1 Fk(k;µ) < 1 ¡ ± almost surely in µ (where Fk is the derivative
with respect to k) we know that there exists a k<1 such that kt < k ;
also, if F and u are assumed to be continuous in [0,k]; then the mappings
A; ` and r are clearly continuous and bounded in this interval, so A2 and
A3 are satis¯ed. The assumption that u is continuous plus the assump-
tions on the shock s we have introduced above guarantee that the value
function of autarky va
j is continuous and bounded for both agents, which
guarantees A4. Furthermore, if u and F are assumed quasi-concave, then
assumption A4b is also satis¯ed.30
Finally, for the interiority condition A5, we ¯rst assume that k0 ¸
kl for kl > 0 su±ciently small31,a n dt h a tf o ra l lk ¸ kl a n de a c hp o s -
sible value of the technology shock F(k;µ) ¸ cl + ±kl for some cl > 0.
This is satis¯ed, for example, if F is increasing, the usual Inada condi-
tion F
0(0) = 1 holds. Under such conditions, a feasible sequence for
consumptions and investments can be constructed to satisfy
b it = ±k
l; b kt =( 1¡ ±)b kt¡1 +b it b cjt = !jt +
F(b kt;µ) ¡ ±kl
3
(14)
for all t: This sequence satis¯es b kt ¸ kl and, therefore, b cjt ¸ !jt + cl=3:
Since cl=3 units of production are thrown away every period, we have
b c1t + b c2t +b it · F(b kt;µ t)+!1t + !2t + cl=3 and the choice variables are
in the interior of the feasible set. Finally, de¯ne the function ³(c)=
min!2S
!j u(!+ c)¡u(!), where S!j is the support of all !jt and assume
that, for any c>0; we have ³(c) > 0. 32 Then we have that u(b cjt) ¡
30Proving A4b is very easy in this example because of the fact that va does not
depend on endogenous variables. In models where the value of autarky depends on
the capital, such as the model of Marcet and Marimon (1992), proving quasi-concavity
is more complicated.
31Or, alternatively, by introducing the constraint kt ‚ kl in the technology A:
32That ‡(c) > 0 can be guaranteed, for example, if the derivative of u is bounded
away from zero in the support of the !0s. Most applications satisfy this property.





l)( 1 5 )
Therefore, we conclude that under mild assumptions on the technol-
ogy, preferences and endowments A1-A4, A4b & A5 are satis¯ed. The-
orem 4 guarantees that all solutions to the planner's problem (PP) can
be found by solving SPFE and viceversa. If we relax the quasi-concavity
assumption (for example, if F has an interval of increasing returns) The-
orem 4a still guarantees that solutions to the SPFE are solutions to the
PP.
Example 2
Assumptions A1{A4 can be dealt with in a similar manner as Ex-
ample 1, so we will not repeat them here.
To guarantee assumption A4b and A5, however, is not easy in this
example. The ¯rst di±culty in is that, because of the 'equality' sign in
equation (9) the set of allocations satisfying this equation is not convex,
and the interiority assumption can not be satis¯ed. We will proceed by
replacing the equality in the PP by a weak inequality; if we can then
show that in the optimum the planner chooses an allocation where the
equation satis¯ed as an equality, we can be sure that the optimum is the
same as with (9) and that we are solving the model of interest33.
Now we have to decide if we write the inequality as ¸ or as · :
Consider the case ¸ and let the full optimum without distortionary taxes




0(e ct+1)( e rt+1 +1¡ ±)] ¸ ¯Et [u
0(e ct+1)(e rt+1(1 ¡ e ¿t+1)+1¡ ±)];
33Note that a similar approach is used in standard general equilibrium theory,
where feasibility constraints written as an equality usually do not deﬂne a convex set.
Often, the equality is replaced with a weak inequality and the appeal to non-satiated
preferences guarantees that the feasibility constraint is also satisﬂed as equality.
48where the ¯rst equality is a property of the full-optimum and the inequal-
ity follows from the fact that tax rates are positive. Hence, changing the
equality in (9) to a ¸ would make the ¯rst best feasible, the solution
would be the ¯rst optimum, which is not the same as the Ramsey equi-
librium. So, this option does not deliver a solution equivalent to the
solution under (9).
Now, let us consider the case of replacing the equality with a · to
consider the restriction
u
0(ct) · ¯Et [u
0(ct+1)(rt+1(1 ¡ ¿t+1)+1¡ ±)]: (16)





t is an upper bound on capital imposed on the consumer. The
Euler equation (16), therefore, corresponds to a policy environment where
the government has the ability to impose some upper bounds on capital
accumulation kU
t on the consumer, and the policy instruments available
to the planner are now fkU
t ;¿ tg. Any sequence fct;k t;¿ t;c
g
tg that satis¯es
(16) can be implemented by a government policy that sets kU
t = kt in
periods and realizations when the inequality is satis¯ed as strict inequal-
ity and kU
t very large if (16) is satis¯ed as equality. It is clear that the
planner will choose sequences where (16) is satis¯ed as an equality, since
the equilibrium with distorting taxes has underaccumulation of capital





. This implies that the planner facing
restrictions (16) and (17) will not choose a sequence where kU
t is binding,
and the government will act so that (16) is satis¯ed as an equality. Then,
the optimum under (16) is equivalent to the Ramsey equilibrium.
Under this modi¯cation, it is clear that the interiority condition A5
is satis¯ed, since the planner could choose a set of upper bounds to the
capital stocks that are binding. This shows that, in this example, the
su±ciency of SPFE is guaranteed.
However, in order to be sure that SPFE has a solution we have
to make sure that the solution to PP is also a SPP solution. As we
49have seen this is guaranteed if our convexity assumptions (A4b or B1b)
are satis¯ed34. Nevertheless, virtually all studies of Ramsey equilibria
proceed by analyzing the lagrangean directly, without checking whether
the convexity assumptions are satis¯ed (and often they are not), taking
the existence of solutions -to SPP- for granted. In fact, if a solution to
S P Pe x i s t s ,o u rr e s u l t sg u a r a n t e et h a ts u c has o l u t i o nc a nb ef o r m u l a t e d
recursively in term of the SPFE and, of course, this also provides a
solution to PP.
34It can be shown that, under some restrictive conditions on utility functions and
productions functions, the feasible set is convex. For example, u(c) · e¡￿c; c
g
t • cg
for cg small, F000 ¡ cg @
2(F
0=F)
@2k < 0 for all cg • cg,a n d￿t=1 guarantees concavityo f
h(¢;¢;¢;¢;s), a much stronger condition than the quasi-concavity assumption of B1b.
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